We give new mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the offline, secretary, and prophet-with-samples models. Specifically, we obtain the following guarantees for social welfare maximization with $m$…
We investigate the growth trajectory of online platforms operating as market makers in two-sided matching markets. Their expansion, often referred to as the ``chicken-and-egg dilemma'' in the…
We study the \emph{voter model with opinion graph}, a generalization of the standard (pull) voter model that adds a notion of bounded confidence. In this process, we consider a finite set $A$ of $n$…
In multi-group learning, a single predictor must perform nearly as well as the best hypothesis in a class on every group in a rich, possibly infinite and overlapping, collection of subpopulations.…
Generating an image with a diffusion or flow-matching model typically involves integrating a velocity field for hundreds of sequential steps. That computation suits a GPU poorly and an analog…
Deploying AI agents to combat dishonest communication is an intuitive response to deception in hybrid human-AI societies. However, the efficacy of such interventions in realistic networked settings…
Event sequences are chains of random events, each described by heterogeneous (numerical and categorical) features. The problem of event sequence forecasting occurs in finance, healthcare, business…
A login screen that appears after a tap on Sign in is expected; the same screen after a tap on View order is an attack. For GUI agents, safety is therefore a property of the transition rather than of…
A fixed network of McCulloch-Pitts threshold units with weights in {-1,0,1} can hold other threshold networks in its state and run them: the state is a ring of banks of records, each record a unit of…
We study worst-case VCG redistribution mechanism design for the public project problem, where n agents decide whether to build a non-excludable public project and the designer chooses a Groves term…
We study temporal fair division with indivisible goods that arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. In contrast to the usual online model, we assume that valuations and future arrivals…
We study online learning in market making, where, at each round, a market maker posts bid and ask prices before observing the market price and the private valuation of an incoming trader. In this…
This work examines the transfer of a co-evolved communication mechanism between two robotic agents from a discrete two-dimensional (2D) simulator to a three-dimensional simulator with real physics…
We study reward design for delegated representatives who acquire costly information and vote on a binary governance proposal. Effort improves both private information and delegated voting weight.
Spiking neural networks (SNNs) offer sparse and event-driven computation, making them attractive for energy-constrained reinforcement learning (RL) on edge devices. In value-based RL, deep spiking…
We study many-to-one, two-sided stable matching problems in which preferences are complementary and firms and workers may rank the same allocation differently. Here a coalition is a group of workers…
We study the complexity of Nash equilibrium computation in discrete Colonel Blotto games. For two-player general-sum Colonel Blotto with monotonic piecewise-constant battlefield payoffs, we show that…
When auction bidders misperceive their rivals, a seller can change not only the amount of information rent but also the states in which it is delivered. We ask when this payment-design opportunity…
Variational quantum algorithms turn choices of Hamiltonian, ansatz, and parameterization into a classical nonconvex optimization problem. We study how this objective function can be visualized and…
We study learning in continuous games when players receive only pairwise preference feedback, revealing which of two actions is preferred but neither payoff values nor preference magnitudes. We first…
Segment-based explanation methods such as LIME return a single explanation for each prediction, computed from one fixed image segmentation. This hides two important facts: a prediction can be…